

KARMA &  
REDEMPTION  
A.G. HOGG



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# KARMA AND REDEMPTION

*AN ESSAY TOWARD THE  
INTERPRETATION OF HINDUISM  
AND THE RE-STATEMENT OF CHRISTIANITY*

A. G. HOGG

*With an Introduction*

BY

ERIC J. SHARPE



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## INTRODUCTION

WHEN a book written more than sixty years ago is reprinted, it is usually for one of two reasons: either because it occupies an important place in the history of its subject, or because there are those who believe that it may still have something of value to contribute to present-day discussion. A. G. Hogg's *Karma and Redemption*, first published in book form in 1909, is being reissued for both these reasons, but before I say more about them, a few words are necessary about its author and about the circumstances which led him to write on this subject.

Alfred George Hogg (1875-1954) was a Scottish educational missionary who served the Madras Christian College from the time of his appointment in 1902 until his retirement in 1938, first as Professor of Philosophy and after 1928 as Principal. He was in many ways an unusual missionary, not least because his formal training had been almost entirely in the field of philosophy; he came to India, in fact, as a lay teacher of philosophy, and was not ordained (into the ministry of the United Free Church of Scotland) until some years later. With characteristic modesty he always regarded himself as no more than an amateur theologian, though this was certainly not the view of those who knew his considerable theological gifts.

Hogg, born in Egypt of missionary parents, was educated in Edinburgh, at George Watson's College and

the University of Edinburgh, where he read philosophy under Professor Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (1856-1931). Pringle-Pattison is not now remembered as a greatly original thinker; but he was a notably successful teacher of philosophy who insisted on independent thought on the part of his pupils. He trained a remarkable number of future professors of philosophy, and thus came to exercise a profound, if indirect, influence on the development of British philosophy. His dominant interest was the correlation of philosophical ideas with the data of religious experience, and he tried to reconcile the best that religion required with the best thinking that philosophy could offer.

There are numerous echoes of Pringle-Pattison in Hogg's work. Pringle-Pattison was an idealist, in that he held that man's knowledge of the universe must be true and valid, and that there is nothing in the universe which is essentially unknowable (even though there may be a great deal in it which is unknown). Philosophy he once called ' . . . a war against abstractions, against stopping too soon, against treating parts as wholes, against isolating parts from their connections'. If philosophy, then, is an attempt to understand the world in which we live in its essential wholeness, clearly philosophical thinking is a matter of the most profound importance, and part of the serious business of every man's life. Hogg (as his students soon discovered) shared this view, although he recognized that there may be a great gulf fixed between the ideal and the actual, in philosophy as in all else.

'Theoretically, indeed (wrote Hogg), the claim of philosophy to be the final arbiter of truth is absolute

and cannot be directly gainsaid. For in theory philosophy is simply the effort to think quite clearly and critically—to let no assumptions pass without question and to be content with nothing less than a completely intelligible account of the whole of experience. By its very definition, therefore, a perfect philosophy would give the fairest and truest possible interpretation of religious experience as well as of all other experience, and if religious belief ventured to interpret religious experience differently from such a perfect philosophy, its interpretation must be wrong. However, although in theory the authority of philosophy is thus absolute, in practice it is the most difficult of all intellectual disciplines to carry out perfectly.

Elsewhere Hogg wrote that the philosophical ideal which motivated him was

' . . . the ideal of dragging into the light of full consciousness every inherited and unconscious presupposition, and letting none pass muster till it had been examined and found legitimate.'

Another debt owed by Hogg to Pringle-Pattison was in the field of religion. Although Pringle-Pattison had been brought up in an orthodox Christian milieu, his own mature personal faith was broadly theistic, rather than explicitly orthodox, and his pupils were taught along these general lines. As a student, Hogg had found difficulty in reconciling philosophical reasoning with the authoritative claims of Christian orthodoxy, since these claims had to be weighed and examined like all others. In the process, he passed through a profound spiritual crisis, from which he was finally extricated

largely through the influence of that school of Christian theology associated with the name of the German theologian Albrecht Ritschl, mediated to him by his close friend David S. Cairns. I do not have space to discuss this episode in detail here, save to say that he was liberated from dependence on the absolute and unquestioned authority of either Scripture or Church into free commitment to Jesus Christ. In his own words (written some years later):

'In Jesus I have met a man in the deliverances of whose knowledge of God, I, at long last, find I cannot help putting more trust than in my own intuitions of, or reasonings about, God. He has so conquered my mind that henceforth I am sure that if any reasoning, mine or another's, conflicts with His intuition of God, the reasoning must be in error and He must be right. Further, in His earthly activity I have met in operation a confident purpose to redeem and transfigure myself and others and the universe in general; and I find that I can put my trust in the success of this His purpose, and apart from this will of Jesus to save me I know of no other sufficient hope for my soul. Finally, I find that the submission of my mind to that of Jesus and trust in His redeeming purpose, so far from narrowing and deadening my life, as any kind of fanaticism ought to do, broadens my life and releases my spiritual energies. Of this experience I can think of no other rationalisation than the hypothesis that in Jesus the man I meet God Himself.'

The first of these convictions—that of the imperative necessity of philosophical reasoning—made Hogg a

philosopher and educationalist. The second—that of the absolute claim of Jesus upon his own and others' allegiance—made him a missionary.

*Karma and Redemption* was the first of Hogg's four books to be published. Its five chapters were originally written as separate articles in the *Madras Christian College Magazine* during 1904 and 1905, and the book itself appeared, as I have said, in 1909. At that time, Hogg, newly arrived in India, was deeply concerned with the problems arising out of the fact of human suffering and the existence of evil in the world. The problem was particularly acute in that the young Hindus he was teaching were apt to claim that the doctrine of Karma provided a better solution to the problem of unmerited suffering than anything the Christian Gospel could offer. Their answer was that all suffering is merited, by virtue of one's suffering in a previous existence, and that the problem is therefore unreal. Were this solution to be accepted, however, it would make nonsense of the Christian claim that Jesus in some way bore the suffering of mankind, since it would make the idea of vicarious suffering impossible. Every man must in other words suffer the precise consequences of his own misdeeds, neither more nor less.

The examination of the rival answers to this problem gave Hogg the opportunity of doing two things. First, of subjecting the Hindu view of Karma and the Christian view of Redemption to the most rigorous philosophical analysis. And secondly, of attempting to restate the Christian position in such a way as to emphasize its relevance to the Indian situation. In 1904

he had written (in a letter): 'I feel that if Christianity is to conquer India the old doctrines must go first and new ones—like the old and yet Indian in colour—must take their place.' *Karma and Redemption* was his first extended attempt to formulate such 'new' doctrines.

The genesis of Hogg's book is not without interest. In the August, 1904 issue of the *Madras Christian College Magazine* there had appeared an article from the pen of S. Subrahmanya Sastri entitled 'Hindu Philosophy', in which it was claimed that '... the doctrines of Karma and the transmigration of souls, which are the highest sanctions of Hindu morality, are also the cardinal principles of Hindu philosophy'. Sastri also claimed that the sense of just recompense for all one's deeds, whether good or evil, was the highest conceivable principle of morality, since it abolished any necessity for explaining away the mystery of unmerited suffering. These were no small claims; but they were in every way representative of the claims being advanced on behalf of Hinduism, and against Christianity, in these years.

Hogg was prompted to reply, and in the following month's issue of the *Madras Christian College Magazine* he published an article entitled 'Mr. Subrahmanya Sastri on Hindu Philosophy', in which he first expressed his appreciation of the generally critical spirit in which the previous article had been written. But he had serious criticisms to make nevertheless. The first of these concerned Sastri's over-eagerness to emphasize resemblances between Hindu and Western philosophy. 'Why is it,' asked Hogg, 'that in drawing comparisons between Hindu and European philosophy he is so often

willing to accentuate superficial parallelisms and ignore fundamental contrasts?' He felt that nothing was to be gained by minimizing the differences between East and West; a great deal might be gained, on the other hand, by trying to understand them. And in this process of understanding, realism and critical acumen are absolutely necessary; it is as essential to see what Hinduism is not, as to see what it is. This is not just a matter of pouring cold water on individual enthusiasm: 'No one would desire to depreciate Hindu philosophy, were its flatterers only discriminating.' It is possible that at this point, Hogg also had in mind certain of the Theosophists, such as Annie Besant, for whom the Hindu tradition could do, and contain, no wrong. But he was emphatically not concerned with mere polemics.

The basic problem was a serious one for the Christian, and especially for the Christian philosopher. Allowing that, as Sastri was claiming, the doctrines of Karma and transmigration were 'the cardinal principles of Hindu philosophy', was it also true to claim that they provided an all-sufficient motivation for ethical action? Hogg's contention was that they did not, and could not do so. Nor did they provide such a clear and cogent solution of the problem of suffering as some of their defenders were attempting to maintain.

In this preliminary article there were three points in particular which Hogg brought out for comment and criticism. The first was the Hindu assumption that the world, partaking as it does of *māyā*, must be denied and transcended, and that the task of philosophy is to point the way to such a transcendence of the

are still, at any time, worthy of the name must be one and the same'. But—and this is an important reservation—he still considers the differences between 'the intellectual beliefs by which men preserve this common spirit of faith' to be 'an immensely important matter'.

Here we are introduced for the first time to the distinction between *faith* and *beliefs* which was such an important constituent element in Hogg's theology. Faith is immediate and existential: a living trust in God, a living relationship with God and a desire for intelligent fellowship with God. Beliefs are those intellectual expressions to which men resort in order to express the implications and consequences of their faith, to protect their faith, to perpetuate their faith and to attempt to communicate their faith. As such, they are constantly liable to change. Indeed, they *must* change if the underlying faith is to live; particularly so, if faith is to be transplanted, as Christianity had been transplanted, from one part of the world to another. If they do not change, but are adhered to blindly, faith may decline into superstition and the beliefs themselves may become obstacles to faith.

The subtitle of *Karma and Redemption* is 'An Essay toward the Interpretation of Hinduism and the Restatement of Christianity'. Both aspects are important, and both are to be understood in terms of the above distinction between faith and beliefs. Hogg's purpose was, amid all the more obvious contrasts between Christianity and Hinduism in the area of beliefs, to find one fundamental contrast capable of illuminating other contrasts; and having done that, to examine both sides of the contrast; to state both fully and

fairly, and to draw whatever conclusions might suggest themselves.

Hogg believed that the area of thought covered by the Hindu idea of Karma and the Christian doctrine of Redemption provided such a point of departure. But these doctrines (or beliefs) were merely symbolical of a much deeper conflict of principle. The crux, he maintained, was to be found at the very roots of man's view of the universe. Put in the form of a question: Is the universe judicial, or is it moral? 'The question between Hindu and Christian, therefore, is not whether God is just or unjust, but whether the purpose of the present order is judicial or moral.' If God is 'imperturbable self-sufficiency', then an order like Karma, which insists (or appears to insist) on mechanical retribution—a judicial system without a personal judge—is understandable; but if God be conceived of as Love, then some degree of personal intervention in the present order is not only understandable, but necessary:

'The Christian does not need to prove the world to be perfect before he can venture to call it God's world. He only needs to show it to be a world such that infinite Love can express itself therein. He does not require to prove that evil is totally absent; he only requires to show that divine Love, having created the possibility of sonship by the grant of human freedom, can joyfully triumph by self-sacrifice over the evil to which human wills give birth.'

I began by saying that there are two reasons for the reprinting of *Karma and Redemption*. The first of these is historical. This book occupies a place all its own in the history of Christian thought in India; in my

judgment it is one of the most powerful and original works of Christian theology ever to have been written by a working missionary. If proof of this be needed, one may perhaps compare it with other 'comparative' works written by missionaries at the same time, far too many of which are characterized by an overfondness for polemics, a superficiality of judgment, and the endless reiteration of dogmatic formulæ. Hogg's book goes to the philosophical and theological heart of things, refusing to be satisfied either by apparent contrasts or by apparent resemblances between Christian and Hindu ideas. *Karma and Redemption* was important, too, in helping to shape the thought of Commission IV at the World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh in 1910.

But this book should not be read only for antiquarian reasons. Inevitably there are passages in it which are dated, but re-reading its massive argument, one is struck time and time again by its relevance to present-day debate. If there is to be an effective dialogue between Hindu and Christian thinkers in India, such dialogue will not be served by refusing to face up to the real differences in thought and outlook which characterize the two sides. Impatient polemics are worse than useless; but at the other extreme, to call the Hindu an anonymous Christian, or the Christian a crypto-Hindu, is to do profound injustice to both. To seize upon apparent resemblances in thought and practice, and to proceed upon the assumption that here is common ground, without subjecting them to proper scrutiny, will in the long run be self-defeating. Hogg's way was to subject Christian and Hindu thought alike

to the most rigorous and searching criticism, with a view to ascertaining genuine, relevant and vital points of contrast, and with a view to posing a challenge to all concerned, Christians as well as Hindus.

The last two sentences of *Karma and Redemption* are deserving of the most serious consideration by all who are in any way concerned with the future of Christian thought in India. 'Educated India,' writes Hogg, 'declares that she will never become Christian; and certainly she will never definitely embrace Christianity until Christian doctrines have been recast in a less alien mould. If this essay, even by its failures, impels any one to begin for himself the task of reconstruction, the author will feel amply rewarded.' This, surely, is one of the contemporary concerns of dialogue. But there is all the difference in the world between reshaping Christian thought entirely on the basis of Hindu premises (as some are urging us to do) and reshaping Christian thought with reference to important Hindu ideas, yet refusing to abandon that which makes the Christian Gospel unique—the centrality of the historical person of Jesus Christ. It is this latter path that Hogg bids us tread.

There is one other point which I should like to make in conclusion. It has often been objected that Christian thought in the West has been far too Western: that it has seldom or never taken into account the spiritual heritage of the East when formulating its intellectual position. A. G. Hogg was a Western philosopher and theologian: philosophically an idealist, theologically (in some sense at least) a 'Ritschlian'. His encounter with the Hindu doctrines of Karma and transmigration,



however, turned his thinking into paths which none of his gifted contemporaries had ever trodden. In this sense, *Karma and Redemption* is a work, not of Christian apologetics for India merely, but of universal Christian theology. It should never have been allowed to drift into oblivion, and its reappearance is a Christian publishing event of great importance.

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## PREFACE

IF any Hindus honour this little essay with their attention its author would like to say to them at the outset that he accepts one belief which is very common to-day in India, but accepts it at the same time with a reservation. The belief is that the innermost faith of all religions which are still, at any time, worthy of the name must be one and the same. The reservation is that he considers the divergences between the intellectual beliefs by which men seek to preserve this common spirit of faith to be nevertheless an immensely important matter.

It seems to him that the secret spring of real living religion anywhere can be nothing but a simplicity of assurance that the supreme religious Reality is humanly satisfying, or in the words of the Christian apostle that God is light and in Him is no darkness at all. *Nothing but* such an assurance has he said? Why such an assurance is just everything. It is the joy of life, it vanquishes death—this message from the living heart of religion that God is light and in Him is nothing of the dark. No message less tremendous than this seems worth erecting into a religion. No faith less glorious than this is big enough to live upon. Yet, if the fact be so—if all religions in the days of their healthy vitality have been at one in this inner faith or confidence, why have they been so much at variance in their beliefs? The reason is this. No people or race can think

trustfully of God as a Being wholly 'light,' wholly satisfying, if they find this world which has its being in or through Him unsatisfying and darkened with undeserved calamity. Such an experience perplexes men, and must make impossible any trust in God unless they learn to think about Him and His relation to the world in some way which will show its sorrows to be blessings in disguise and will make life satisfying again. Such a way of thinking is a religious belief, a belief *about* God, rendering possible faith or trust *in* God. And obviously the beliefs by which peoples or races learn to protect their faith in God must be at least as different as are the problems that darken their life and perplex their thought.

Variety in the doctrinal tenets of different religions is thus quite an intelligible phenomenon, and within proper limits a sign of healthy vitality. In fact, it may appear to many that the explanation just offered of the relation between faith and belief fully justifies the common assumption that differences of creed do not matter. Yet this is a superficial view: it is so for two reasons. The human soul needs something more than to be able to trust God; it craves also to have intelligent fellowship with Him. This it cannot have except in so far as it is able to think about life and conduct in the same way that God does. And for this it is necessary that its beliefs about the nature of God and His relation to the world be true ones. That is the first reason. The second is that if a people's religious beliefs about God are not perfectly true it will some day outgrow them. They will cease to lighten the

shadows of life and to explain its problems; nay more, if still adhered to, the beliefs which once helped to make faith possible will now become stumbling-blocks making real trust in God and utter devotion to Him difficult or even impossible. When any religion comes to such a pass the duty of the true man of faith is boldly to surrender the old beliefs and to seek for new and truer ones. But for a people wedded to its creed this is a heroic task, and a less arduous course is apt to be followed. Either the old beliefs are blindly held to and the religion declines from a faith into a superstition; or else a more complicated development may take place. The old beliefs have now become obstacles to faith, darkening life with new shadows and creating new perplexities. New theories may, therefore, be elaborated which, while admitting the old beliefs to be true, seem to throw light upon the shadows and to explain the perplexities. In this way the religion is saved from the degradation of its beliefs into mere superstitions which can nourish no living trust in God; but at the same time it is prevented from rising to a higher level of more intelligent fellowship with the Being on whom its faith still reposes.

These preliminary observations should be sufficient to set in a clear light the double purpose which runs through the pages of the present essay. In the first place, the essay is the endeavour of a Christian, to whom the beliefs of even the higher Hinduism appear strange and rather dismal, to win his way to a more sympathetic point of view which may enable him to understand how to Hindus these beliefs

can be a real gospel, helping them to a trustful surrender of their wills to the Supreme Being. He finds this point of view in the hypothesis that the theory of Karma and transmigration, although originally a religious belief which helped to explain life and make trust in God possible, became subsequently a stumbling-block to faith and cast a shadow over existence; and that thereupon the more spiritual sons of India, instead of boldly surrendering the outgrown theory, found relief by accepting the esoteric teaching of the Upanishads that the whole Karma-ridden system was phenomenal only, hiding rather than revealing the satisfying Divinity. In the second place, the essay endeavours to show, by careful analysis of the Karma-transmigration theory, that it would have been better for India if she had surrendered her belief in terrestrial re-incarnations and had modified her idea of Karma; at the same time an interpretation is presented of the significance of the person and life of Jesus which makes it evident that Christianity really offers to set faith free from the feeling which in India has been its great problem—the feeling of the weariness of life and the unjustifiableness of unmerited suffering.

The essay originally appeared in the form of a series of articles in the pages of the *Madras Christian College Magazine*, 1904-1905. Its re-publication, with the courteous permission of the editor, is due solely to desires expressed in several quarters that the articles should be made more conveniently accessible. These desires seem to justify the hope that, however uncertain may be the value of the central hypothesis of the

essay, the line of inquiry which it opens up may prove stimulating and suggestive to many. Advantage has been taken of the opportunity of revision afforded by re-publication, but the changes made, although in one or two cases not unimportant, are few in number and do not alter the main structure of the argument. To assist the reader in tracing the connexion between the necessarily wide ramifications of the discussion a full analytical table of contents has been provided, as well as a marginal analysis.

*Madras Christian College,*  
*July 13th, 1909.*

A. G. HOCC.

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Hinduism and Christianity display a bewildering medley of aspects of resemblance and contrast. In spite of the discordant internal variety visible in the doctrines and practices of both religions, it is permissible to treat Christianity and the higher Hinduism as unities, and to ask which of their points of divergence is fundamental and affords the key to an understanding of the others. This key is not to be found in pantheistic tendency, nor in intellectualism, nor in innate repugnance to the idea of intrusions of the Deity into history; but it may reasonably be looked for in the difference of horizon and outlook resulting from the presence in India, and the absence from Christendom, of belief in Karma and transmigration. This belief owes its continued hold mainly to the plausible solution it offers of the problem of suffering. It is ethically commendable for its emphasis on the necessity of expiation, its denial of 'salvation by works,' and its insistence on individual retribution. If the Christian critic thinks that these advantages are counterbalanced by serious ethical defects, he ought in fairness to consider whether the higher Hinduism is not itself, from beginning to end, an implicit criticism of Karma.

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Christian and Hindu agree that the Karma-transmigration system is unreal *metaphysically*, although the latter believes that it is nevertheless phenomenally actual. Would it not be more natural for him to push his dissatisfaction with the system a step

further and to call in question its phenomenal as well as its noumenal existence? But is the Hindu after all really dissatisfied with the Karma-transmigration system? Is his denial of its metaphysical reality ultimately connected with an inability to find moral or religious contentment in the system, and is it therefore equivalent to an implicit criticism of the Karma-transmigration idea? On two grounds we may answer, 'yes'; (1) on historical grounds; since it is difficult to explain how the inheritors of the joyous Aryan faith could ever have found in a message of release from phenomenal life a welcome gospel, unless something had first crept in to destroy their joy in life; and no sufficient influence of this sort is discoverable but that of the popularly invented Karma-transmigration belief; (2) on grounds yielded by the analysis of Indian religious thought; for systems so different as the Advaita-Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya philosophy, and the Śaiva Siddhānta all betray an exaggeratedly individualistic impulse which looks like a reaction from the fatalism of the Karma-system; and the Bhagavadgītā teaches an ethic of unmotivated willing, which looks like a reaction from the selfishness of the Karmic maxim of practising virtue in order to acquire merit.

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Why should we not boldly call in question the whole conception of a law of Karma? It is incapable of scientific demonstration, is inconsistent with natural law, and empties history of all social interest. If it be replied that the law of Karma is an indispensable moral postulate, the answer is that, on the contrary, it is ethically defective. Although excellent in its emphasis upon the intrinsic connexion between sin and punishment it hinders the profounder developments of the guilt-consciousness. For by its principle that the purpose of every birth is requital, it makes the dispensing of judgment not simply a presupposition but the chief end of Divine Providence; and no man can feel it either an absolute duty to cooperate with, or an infinite sin to rebel against, such a Divine end as this. Even when set in the light of the higher Hindu teaching, the Karma-transmigration system still remains an obstacle in the way of the deepest conceptions of guilt. Granting, however, that the law of Karma is both scientifically indefensible and

ethically inadequate, can we still cling to belief in it as indispensable for the solution of the problem of suffering? No, for it is not indispensable except upon the assumption already criticized, viz., that the chief purpose of Divine providence is requital. Christianity, being committed to a more inspiring view of the Divine purpose in history, feels unmerited suffering not an injustice but a privilege.

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It is not only Hinduism but metaphysical thought generally that is tempted to deny real significance to history. Christian thought might well have fallen into the same snare but for the fact that Christianity is essentially the gospel of an event—the coming of Christ. The advance of revelation consists in successive answers to progressive religious problems; so too in the case of Christianity. By His life and His claims Jesus created a religious problem which constantly develops new phases, but ever requires the same type of solution, viz., one that, whatever the terms employed, recognizes in Jesus 'God manifest in the flesh'. Now if, like the early disciples, Christians generally are led to this estimate of Jesus, then, like Paul and the author of *Hebrews*, they must feel committed to a religious interpretation of history. For the God 'manifest' in Jesus is an active God and a universal Father. But if God be active, then providence is a reality; and if God be universal Father, then the aim of His providence throughout all history must have been not requital but to draw men into fellowship with Himself in the voluntary service of the absolute good.

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Jesus' revelation of God as active Love removes the theoretical difficulty of admitting the reality of moral evil, and affords a direct explanation of the origin of natural evil and unmerited suffering. Thus we arrive at a revised law of Karma, according to which the fruit of deeds is not an individual but a social burden, and is modifiable by the attitude and the conduct of one and all. The natural tendency of evil Karma is cumulative, and its drift is

towards the absolute ruin of humanity. But by entailing unmerited suffering, it provides love with an opportunity of supreme self-expression potent to reclaim the wrong-doer. The transcendent instance of love sharing undeservedly in the Karma of sin is Jesus; and when the eyes of men are opened to the fact that this Sufferer is no ordinary man but God incarnated for the purpose of winning them to goodness, the spectacle of His life becomes charged with a power of regeneration for humanity. Such a view of redemption through Christ, however, cannot be accepted as a full and complete account of the reaction of Divine love against sin. Anselm's theory of Atonement, although intrinsically unsatisfactory and in certain respects out of harmony with the spirit of the New Testament, expresses a true Christian instinct, viz., the feeling that a holy Deity's ability to forgive is a perplexing fact. The theoretical solution of the perplexity lies in the difference between the laws of the political State and the laws of the Divine order. When we comprehend this difference we realize how much lies behind forgiveness; we realize that the reaction of Divine love against sin does not consist merely in this, that out of pity God adopts the expedient of sharing the Karma of humanity as a promising means of checking the drift toward ruin; but even more in this, that in the face of sin God cannot but sacrifice Himself to the uttermost in the struggle to abolish sinfulness.